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FOREIGN COMMERCE AND STATE POWER:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE
BUY AMERICAN STATUTES
More than half the states in the United States have statutes or policies
that favor domestically produced goods over goods of foreign origin for
purposes of state government purchasing. Unsuccessful contract bidders
have, upon occasion, attacked the constitutionality of these statutes and
policies. The most recent decision assessing the validity of such statutes is
KS.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply
Commission.' The New Jersey Supreme Court in that case held that a
New Jersey Buy American statute, which required state government agen-
cies to purchase only American-made goods, did not violate the foreign
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.2
In reaching its decision, the New Jersey court relied on Hughes v. Alex-
andria Scrap Corp.,3 a United States Supreme Court opinion interpreting
the interstate commerce clause. The New Jersey court's reliance on Alex-
andria Scrap raises new questions about the constitutionality of state stat-
utes and policies that give preference to domestically produced goods in
public contract bids. It also provides a basis for reexamining the relation-
ship between the interstate and foreign commerce powers and for reevalua-
ting the proper scope of the Alexandria Scrap holding.
This Note briefly surveys the history and background of Buy American
statutes. It then discusses the K.S.B. Technical Sales and Alexandria Scrap
decisions and examines the factors that distinguish them. A proposal is
made that foreign commerce cases be analyzed under a rubric distinct from
that under which interstate commerce cases are treated. The Note con-
cludes by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of such a bifurcated ap-
proach to commerce clause analysis.
1. 75 NJ. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1635 (1978).
2. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides that "It]he Congress shall have Power.. .[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." The constitutional
powers over interstate and foreign commerce have developed in related fashion, and most
jurists denominate the quoted passage from the Constitution as simply the commerce clause.
Although there is technically but one clause, a few commentators distinguish between the for-
eiyn and interstate commerce "clauses." See, e.g., Note, Alternative Theoriesfor Establishing a
Federal Common Law of Foreign Judgments in Commercial Cases: The Foreign Affairs Power
and the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 16 VA. J. INr'L L. 635 (1976). See also notes 48-
57 infra and accompanying text. For the sake of simplicity, this distinction is followed here.
3. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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I
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
OF BUY AMERICAN ACTS
In 1933, at the depth of the Great Depression, Congress enacted the
federal Buy American Act.4 That legislation required federal government
agencies to purchase for their needs only domestically made or produced
products, unless the cost of the domestic goods would be "unreasonable" or
unless the purchase would be "inconsistent with the public interest."'5 The
purposes of the Act as revealed by its legislative history were: to provide
relief from unemployment;6 to protect domestic business from foreign
competition;7 to retaliate against similar policies followed by foreign
4. 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10oc (1976).
5. The Act provides:
[U]nless the head of the department or independent establishment concerned shall
determine it to be inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost to be unreasonable,
only such unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been mined or
produced in the United States, and only such manufactured articles, materials, and
supplies as have been manufactured in the United States substantially all from arti-
cles, materials and supplies mined, produced, or manufactured.., in the United
States, shall be acquired for public use.
41 U.S.C. § 10a (1976). This section also makes exceptions for items acquired for use outside
the United States and for items not available in the United States in "sufficient and reasonably
available commercial quantities.., of a satisfactory quality." Id.
The federal regulations that implement the Buy American Act provide specific guidelines
for determining the reasonableness of cost. For example, 41 C.F.R. § 1-18.603-1 (1977) states:
A determination shall be made that the use of domestic construction material would
unreasonably increase the cost where, with respect to each particular construction ma-
teria
(a) A bid or proposal offers nondomestic construction material.., the cost of
which, plus 6 percent thereof, is less than the cost of comparable domestic construction
material; and
(b) That bid or proposal offers the lowest price of any received, after adding to
each bid or proposal, for evaluation purposes, 6 percent of the cost of all nondomestic
construction material ....
Section 1-18.603-3 authorizes deviations from the requirements of the quoted section in ac-
cordance with procedures set forth in 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.009-2 (1977). Subpart 1-6.1 of the same
title contains similar provisions that govern supply and service contracts other than construc-
tion contracts. 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-6.100-.105 (1977).
The relatively flexible provisions of the federal Buy American Act as implemented by the
regulations contrast sharply with some of the state statutes. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
4300-4305 (West 1966). Framed as a flat prohibition against government purchases of for-
eign-made goods, id. § 4303, the California statute has twice been held unconstitutional by that
state's appellate courts, see note 14 infra. Other states, such as New Jersey, have patterned
their statutes after the federal Act, although the state enactments usually have less refined
bidding standards than those of the federal statute and regulations. See note 19 infra.
6. 76 CONG. REc. 3254 (1933) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg).
7. 76 CONG. REc. 3175 (1933) (statement of Sen. Johnson); id. at 3252-53 (statements of
Sens. Blaine and Reed); see also Gantt & Speck, Domestic . Foreign Trade Problems in Federal
Government Contracting. Buy American Act and Executive Order, 7 J. PuB. L. 378, 379-80
(1958).
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,states;8 and to eliminate loopholes in legislative appropriations allowing
government agencies to purchase imported goods.9
Since the enactment of the federal Buy American Act, at least six states
have passed legislation requiring state governmental agencies to purchase
only American-made goods.' 0 Nineteen more states have Buy Local stat-
utes, which prohibit state governmental agencies from purchasing goods
produced or manufactured outside the state." These Buy Local statutes
have the effect of precluding the purchase by state government agencies of
goods produced or manufactured outside the United States, as well as of
goods produced or manufactured in the United States but outside the enact-
ing state. Some commentators have therefore found the Buy Local legisla-
tion "open to the same objections as the Buy American acts."' 12 In addition
to those states that have enacted Buy American or Buy Local statutes, some
states give preference to American-made goods in public contract bids as a
matter of policy, even though they do not statutorily restrict the purchase
by state agencies of foreign-made goods.' 3 Altogether, between one-half
and two-thirds of the states have statutes or policies that favor American-
made goods over foreign-made goods.
Despite this substantial body of state law, few courts have considered
the validity of such state statutes or policies under the foreign commerce
clause. 14 This paucity of litigation may be attributable to the fact that the
8. 76 CONG. REC. 3175 (1933) (statement of Sen. Bingham).
9. See Gantt & Speck, supra note 7, at 381-82.
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 4300-4305 (West 1966); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22(17)
(West 1973); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 52:33-1 to :33-4 (1955); OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 51 (1963); 71 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 639 (Purdon 1962). Hawaii has replaced its Buy American statute, en-
acted in 1933, with a Buy Local statute, HAw. REv. STAT. § 103-43 (1976).
11. ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 41-16-57(b) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 36.20.010 (1962); ARtz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 34-242 (1974); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 8-18-101 to -103 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
283.03 (West 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 73.1 (1973); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 38:2184 (West
1968); ME. Rav. STAT. tit. 5, § 1816(10) (West Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 31-5-23 (1972);
Mo. Rav. STAT. § 8.280 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-5 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-59
(1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 48-02-10 (1978); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 11 (1964); S.C. CODE §
1-1-410 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 5-19-6 (1974); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
664-2 (Vernon 1964); VA. CODE § 11-20.1 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.24.020 (1972).
12. Note, 6 TEX. INTL L.F. 134, 135-36 (1970).
13. In 1964, the National Association of State Purchasing Officials conducted a survey of
state bidding and purchasing practices. The Association found that seven states which had no
statutory restrictions on purchases of foreign materials nevertheless gave preference to domes-
tic goods as a matter of state policy. The author has been unable to locate any more recent
survey of the subject. For a discussion of the 1964 survey, see Note, State "Buy American"
Policies--One Vice, Many Voices, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 584, 585-88 (1964).
14. The trial court in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, No. 899165 (L.A. Co.
Super. Ct. 1966) stated in dictum that the California Buy American Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
4300-4305 (West 1966), was repugnant to the commerce clause. Reporter's Transcript of oral
opinion of the court, Dec. 22, 1966, noted in 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 684-85 (1970). On appeal, one justice wrote a concurring opinion in which he found that
the California statute was an "unconstitutional intrusion into the congressional power '[t]o
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statutes have not always been diligently enforced.' 5 The validity vel non of
these provisions is, however, important to domestic and foreign private en-
terprise and to state governments, because of the substantial effect govern-
ment spending has on both private markets and public economic well-
being.' 6 Moreover, as world trade competition becomes keener,17 produc-
ers and suppliers are likely to press for more rigorous adherence to and
enforcement of state Buy American statutes and policies.
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.'" 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 230, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 806
(1969) (citation omitted).
In American Inst. for Imported Steel, Inc. v. County of Erie, 58 Misc. 2d 1059, 297 N.Y.S.2d
602 (1968), rev'don otherground, 32 A.D.2d 231, 302 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1969), the court held that a
Buy American resolution adopted by the county legislature did not violate the commerce and
supremacy clauses. Other courts have ruled on the validity of statutes that favor American-
made goods over those of foreign manufacture without referring to the foreign commerce
clause. See, e.g., Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803,
821-23, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798, 810-11 (1962) (California Buy American Act conflicts with the
supremacy clause and with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 67 Stat A-Il (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as
GATT]).
15. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 6, K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply Comm'n, 75 NJ. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977) (on file at the Cornell International Law
Journal): "Although the Commission had gone to public advertising for bids on the average of
four or five times per year over the past twenty-six years, its chief engineer, who participated in
the process each time, testified that the Buy American specifications were not included on a
single prior occasion."
16. The amount of state and local purchases has increased substantially in the last 25
years. In 1950, state and local government purchases totalled $20 billion, according to the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The preliminary figures for 1976 indicate that state and
local purchases will total $232 billion, an increase of over one thousand percent in only
twenty-four years. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF Ta UNITED STATES: 1977, at 429 (1977).
17. A recent New York Times editorial noted that
[t]he depressed state of most industrial economies is creating fierce competition for
international markets, threatening profits and jobs in dozens of American industries.
The United States has already backed away from open trade in steel, shoes, TV sets,
sugar and textiles. And similar limits on imports of goods competing with ailing do-
mestic industries are probably on the way.
N.Y. Times, July 5, 1978, at A16, coL I. Similarly, the Chief of the Antitrust Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice has noted that "It]here have been increasing demands for protec-
tion for the steel, color television, footwear and textile industries, with a host of others knock-
ing at the door looking for governmental relief from competitive pressures." Remarks by
John H. Shenefield, Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, before the
ALI-ABA Course of Study on International Antitrust (May 26, 1978), reprinted in [1978] 5
TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) 1 50,371, at 55,810-11. Industry efforts to impede the flow of im-
ports into the American marketplace by invoking legal remedies are leading to increased liti-





A. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE:
K.S.B. TECHNICA SALES AND ALEXANDRIA SCA4P
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in K.S.B. Technical Sales
represents the most authoritative judicial pronouncement to date on the va-
lidity of state Buy American statutes under the foreign commerce clause.' 8
In that case, the North Jersey Water Supply Commission, a state agency
created to develop water supply facilities for northern New Jersey munici-
palities, sought to include in its bidding specifications a provision requiring
that only American-made goods be used in the construction of a water
treatment plant. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary
of a West German manufacturer of pumping equipment, sought to enjoin
18. The New Jersey court also determined that the New Jersey statutes did not conflict
with article III of the GAIT, supra note 14, and that they were not an unconstitutional intru-
sion upon the exclusive foreign affairs power of the federal government.
The GATT is a multilateral international agreement that requires the contracting parties to
treat foreign and domestic products equally with respect to all laws affecting their purchase,
sale, transportation, and use. The New Jersey court found that the New Jersey statute did not
conflict with the GATT because the GATT exempts from its provisions all laws "governing
the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes
and not with a view.., to use in the production of goods for commercial sale." GATT,
supra note 14, art. III, para. 8(a), 62 Stat. 3681 (1948) (original version at 61 Stat. A-19 (1947)).
The plaintiff argued that this exception did not apply because the goods in question were
being purchased by a state agency for use in the production of goods that would be resold
commercially. See Reply Brief for Plaintiffs at 6-11, K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North
Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 NJ. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977) (on file at the Cornell
International Law Journal).
The conflict between the GATT and Buy American statutes has been dealt with extensively
elsewhere. See Jackson, The GeneralAgreement on Tarifs and Trade in United States Domes-
tic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 297-311 (1967); Note, California's Buy-American Policy: Con-
flict with GA7T and the Constitution, 17 STAN. L. REv. 119, 126-32 (1964); Comment, GA7',
The California BuyAmerican Act, And The Continuing Struggle Between Free Trade And Protec-
tionism, 52 CAL. L. REv. 335 (1964); Note, supra note 13. See also Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton
Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1962) (California Buy Amer-
ican Act conflicts with GATT); Territory of Hawaii v. Ho, 41 Hawaii 565 (1957) (statute re-
quiring sellers of foreign eggs to display identifying placards conflicts with GATT).
To support its argument that the New Jersey statute impinged upon the exclusive foreign
relations power of the federal government, the plaintiff in KS.B. Technical Sales relied on the
California appellate court decision in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal.
App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969). 75 N.J. at 292-93, 381 A.2d at 784. The New Jersey
court declined to follow the California court's analysis, choosing instead to take the view pro-
pounded by two commentators who criticized the California decision, see Note, supra note 12;
Note, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 164 (1970).
Since the GATT and the foreign affairs power have already been the subject of such exten-
sive research, this Note does not deal with them except as they incidentally affect commerce
clause analysis. See notes 59-68 infra and accompanying text. For the response of other
courts to arguments similar to those made in K.S.B. Technical Sales, see note 14 supra.
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the inclusion of the Buy American requirement in the bidding specifica-
tions.
The Commission derived its authority to include the Buy American
clause from two New Jersey statutes.1 9 K.S.B. Technical Sales claimed
that those statutes infringed upon the constitutional authority of Congress
to regulate foreign commerce since they were framed as "a wide-angle, all-
inclusive prohibition against any product not produced in the United
States."2 The corporation urged the court to rule that the statutes were
constitutionally infirm when tested against the rule applied by New Jersey
courts to commerce power enactments.21
The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that when the state at-
tempts to regulate the activity of private parties in a manner that affects
interstate or foreign commerce, courts must balance the "local public inter-
est against the extent of the burden" on commerce and consider "the availa-
bility of less onerous alternatives. '2 2 The court distinguished the situation
presented in K.S.B. Technical Sales, stating that it involved "the legal im-
pact of the state's entry into the marketplace as a purchaser of goods, rather
than as a regulator of the commercial activities of others."23 Having used
19. New Jersey has several statutes containing provisions that require agencies of the state
and its subdivisions to purchase only American-made goods. State work is governed by N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:32-1 (West 1955), enacted in 1932. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:11-18 (West 1978)
applies to counties, municipalities, and their agencies. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:33-2 to -3 apply
to all public works. Although there was some confusion at both the trial and appellate levels
about which statutes governed the K.S.B. Technical Sales case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
found that §§ 52:33-2 to -3 applied. Section 52:33-2 provides:
Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of any law, and unless the head of the
department, or other public officer charged with the duty by law, shall determine it to
be inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost to be unreasonable, only domestic
materials shall be acquired or used for any public work.
This section shall not apply with respect to domestic materials to be used for any
public work, if domestic materials of the class or kind to be used are not mined, pro-
duced or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States in commercial quan-
tities and of a satisfactory quality.
Section 52:33-3 states:
Every contract for the construction, alteration or repair of any public work in this
state shall contain a provision that in the performance of the work the contractor and
all subcontractors shall use only domestic materials in the performance of the work;
but if the head of the department or other public officer authorized by law to make the
contract shall find that in respect to some particular domestic materials it is impracti-
cable to make such requirement or that it would unreasonably increase the cost, an
exception shall be noted in the specifications as to that particular material, and a pub-
lic record made of the findings which justified the exception.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:33-2 closely follows the language of 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1976), note 5 supra;
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:33-3 is quite similar to 41 U.S.C. § 10b(a) (1976).
20. Brief for Plaintiffs at 14, K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply Comm'n, 75 NJ. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977) (on file at the Cornell International Law
Journal).
21. Id. at 15.
22. 75 NJ. at 294, 381 A.2d at 785.
23. Id. at 294-95, 381 A.2d at 785.
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the facts of KS.B. Technical Sales to set it apart from other commerce
clause cases, the court went on to apply a different legal standard. The
applicable rule, according to the court, was the one developed by the
United States Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.--"a
state's legislation with respect to its purchase of goods and materials for its
own end use, at least in the absence of federal action, is not subject to the
usual Commerce Clause restrictions." 24
At issue in Alexandria Scrap was the validity of an amendment to a
complex Maryland statutory scheme designed to alleviate the growing aes-
thetic problem of abandoned automobiles.25 The statute established a sys-
tem of monetary bounties and penalties to encourage prompt reprocessing
of junk automobiles. The amendment established different eligibility re-
quirements for in-state and out-of-state processors to obtain the bounties.
Alexandria Scrap argued that the more restrictive requirements applied
against out-of-state processors constituted an undue burden on interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and, for the first
time in its history,26 distinguished between state interference "with the nat-
ural functioning of the interstate market. . . through burdensome regula-
tion" of private trade27 and "the entry by the State itself into the market as
a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce. '28 Al-
though the former kind of state action was subject to the traditional com-
24. Id. at 298, 381 A.2d at 787.
25. The Maryland statutes have been rewritten and recodified since the Supreme Court
decided Alexandria Scrap. See MD. TRAsp. CODE ANN. §§ 15-501 to -514 (1977). In both
the original and recodified versions, the legislature authorized the state to pay bounties to
private scrap processors who destroy junk automobiles formerly titled in Maryland. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 5-205 (1957); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 15-512 (1977); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,796-99 (1976). Originally, bounties for hulks (a special
class of abandoned automobiles more than eight years old) were paid to both Maryland and
out-of-state processors without any requirement of title documentation. MD. ANN. CODE art.
66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(05 (1957); 426 U.S. at 796-97. But in 1974, the Maryland legislature
amended the statute by adding language that required processors to produce documentation of
statutory title. 1974 Md. Laws 1725; 426 U.S. at 800. The amended statute has been recodi-
fled without substantive changes. MD. TRANsp. CODE ANN. § 25-210 (1977). The amend-
ment made the requirements for out-of-state processors more onerous than for prdcessors
situated in the state. This discouraged suppliers from taking their hulks out of Maryland, and
out-of-state processors were no longer able to obtain the bounties they had previously re-
ceived. The plaintiff, a scrap processor whose Virginia business was located not far from the
Maryland border, claimed that the 1974 amendment violated the commerce clause by impe-
ding the free interstate flow of junk automobiles. 426 U.S. at 802.
26. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated:
[q]ntil today the Court has not been asked to hold that the entry by the State itself into
the market as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce cre-
ates a burden upon that commerce if the State restricts its trade to its own citizens or
businesses within the State.
426 U.S. at 808 (1976).
27. Id. at 806.
28. Id. at 808.
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merce clause scrutiny, according to the Court, the latter kind of state action
was not.
The Alexandria Scrap decision is significant because it discarded the
traditional balancing test for determining whether state action violates the
interstate commerce clause.29 In place of the balancing test, the court es-
tablished a zone of immunity that protects certain types of state action from
commerce clause attack, even though that state action substantially affects
interstate commerce. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in K.S.B.
Technical Sales is equally significant because it extends the novel analysis
of Alexandria Scrap to create a comparable zone of immunity for state ac-
tion that substantially affects foreign commerce.
B. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA SCRAP AND
K.SB. TECHNICAL SALES
The New Jersey Supreme Court's heavy reliance upon Alexandria
Scrap to establish a zone of immunity for state action that substantially
affects foreign commerce does not at first seem unreasonable. But closer
inspection of the court's analysis reveals that it is flawed. Important dis-
tinctions exist with respect to the purpose and effect of the statutes chal-
lenged in each of the two cases. Moreover, because foreign commerce was
at issue in K.S.B. Technical Sales, rigid application of the Alexandria Scrap
analysis cannot adequately account for the important international com-
merce considerations present in K.S.B. Technical Sales.
The basic dissimilarity in the purposes of the statutes under attack in
Alexandria Scrap and KS.B. Technical Sales forms a fundamental distinc-
tion between the two cases. The Maryland statute at issue in Alexandria
Scrap was enacted pursuant to a recognized police power purpose: environ-
mental improvement. 30 By contrast, economic protectionism is the pri-
mary and perhaps exclusive purpose of the New Jersey Buy American
statute challenged by the plaintiffs in K.S.B. Technical Sales.3' Whereas
Maryland's statute is designed to promote the purely local interest of reduc-
ing the eyesore of abandoned automobiles, the intended economic protec-
tive effect of the New Jersey statute is not limited to that state's economy.
Indeed, the ancillary effect of the New Jersey provision may be to harm
local interests by increasing state government spending without correspond-
29. See note 35 infra.
30. Indeed, Justice Powell saw fit to state in dictum that "Maryland entered the market for
the purpose, agreed by all to be commendable as well as legitimate, of protecting the State's
environment." 426 U.S. at 809.
31. The Court has placed "repeated emphasis upon the principle that the State may not
promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce."
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949).
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ingly benefiting New Jersey industry.32
The statutes challenged in the two cases also differ markedly in their
effect on commerce. The legislation at issue in K.S.B. Technical Sales bars
state agency purchases of any foreign-made goods. It thus applies to every-
thing from paper clips to water purification equipment. The Maryland
statute in Alexandria Scrap, however, affects only one limited category of
goods, junk automobiles, thereby impeding the total flow of commerce less
than the New Jersey statute.33
The two statutory schemes are further distinguishable on the grounds
that the New Jersey statute directly affects foreign commerce whereas the
Maryland enactment only incidentally affects interstate commerce. The
statute in K.S.B. Technical Sales prohibits outright any purchases of
foreign-made products by state agencies.34 By contrast, the statute in 4lex-
andria Scrap only makes it less likely that Maryland will have to pay boun-
ties to out-of-state processors. 35 As the Alexandria Scrap Court stated, the
Maryland statute has "an impact upon the interstate flow of [junk
automobiles] only because... Maryland effectively. . . made it more lu-
crative for. . . suppliers to dispose of their junk automobiles] in Maryland
rather than take them outside the State." 36
The decision of the New Jersey court to create an area of state action
immune from commerce clause scrutiny also overlooks important foreign
commerce considerations. A statute such as that passed by Maryland may
incidentally affect relations with a neighboring state or its citizens. The
neighboring state can, however, respond in any manner that does not vio-
late the Constitution. When a state statute affects relations with a foreign
nation, however, any retaliatory action taken by the foreign nation is likely
32. For example, a foreign contractor might enter the lowest bid on a government contract
being let by the State of New Jersey, but have his bid rejected because the goods were manu-
factured abroad. If the next lowest bid had been entered by an Ohio contractor and if the
award was subsequently made to him, then goods manufactured in Ohio would be used in the
project and Ohio would receive the economic benefits of increased employment, greater tax
revenues, and other localized economic multiplier effects. New Jersey, however, would re-
ceive none of these benefits. Moreover, New Jersey taxpayers would have to bear the burden
of the more expensive Ohio goods, which the New Jersey state agency had to purchase because
the state Buy American statute barred the agency from accepting the foreign contractor's low
bid.
33. The Court has frequently expressed its view that the total impact upon commerce is an
important criterion. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Di Santo v. Penn-
sylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
34. See note 19 supra.
35. See text accompanying note 25 supra. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Powell
stressed the fact that "Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks." 426 U.S. at 806.
But the implication of the statement when read in context is that the fact of prohibition is
insignificant if the state enters the market as purchaser. In other words, the Court would stress
the significance of an absolute prohibition only when the state is acting as a regulator of pri-
vate trade.
36. 426 U.S. at 806 (footnote omitted).
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to be targeted at the entire United States and not just at the state whose
statute impeded the flow of foreign commerce. Thus, "the nation, not the
state, would have to answer for state-created difficulties with foreign pow-
ers."' 37 Moreover, unlike the situation in which friction exists between two
states, no constitutional limitations restrict the permissible types of retalia-
tion that a foreign nation may employ against a state's discriminatory
purchasing policy.
The importance of these considerations should not be underestimated.
"In an era when 25 to 40 percent of the gross national product of most
countries passes through public budgets, discrimination against foreign
products by governmental selective purchasing constitutes an important
barrier to world trade from a purely quantitative point of view." 38 The
courts should not allow erection of such a significant barrier without first
carefully evaluating the potential impact on commerce between nations.
This the New Jersey court did not do. Rather, the court felt compelled to
apply to K.. Technical Sales the broad holding of Alexandria Scrap that
a state's purchasing activities are entirely excludable from commerce clause
review.3 9 Had the New Jersey court instead been willing to recognize the
substantial distinctions in the purposes and effects of the New Jersey and
Maryland statutes, it might well have applied the traditional commerce
clause balancing test40 and reached a different result.4 1
III
A PROPOSAL TO REVITALIZE THE
FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
Although there may be some justification for deviating from the nor-
mal commerce clause standard of review when a state's purchasing activity
37. Note, supra note 12, at 138.38. Comment, The Buy American Act: Examination, Anaysis and Comparison, 64 MIL L.
REv. 101, 135 (1974) (footnote omitted).
39. 75 NJ. 272, 294-96, 381 A.2d 774, 785-86 (1977).
40. The standard of review in commerce clause cases is a qualified balancing test that
weighs the following factors: the need or desirability of uniform regulation throughout the
nation, the legitimacy of the local interest, the degree to which the state regulation discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce, the effect on commerce, and the availability of alternative
regulatory schemes to promote the same state interests. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-21 (1851). In Pike, the court stated: "Ifa legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden [on interstate
commerce] that will be tolerated will ... depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." 397
U.S. at 142.
The Court has applied the Pike test in both foreign and interstate commerce cases since its
decision in Aiexandria Scrap. See, eg., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 S. Ct. 988, 1005-06
(1978); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. 787, 795 (1978).
41. 75 NJ. 272, 294-98, 381 A.2d 774, 785-87 (1977).
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incidentally affects interstate commerce, the Court in Alexandria Scrap did
not articulate any such justification4 2 and commentators have struggled to
supply one.43 At the root of the decision in Alexandria Scrap may lie the
Court's concern over the states' continued "ability to function effectively in
a federal system." 44 By creating "an area of state action [that] plainly bur-
den[s] commerce. . . . [that is] not easily susceptible of principled limita-
tion,"45 and that is immunized from commerce clause analysis, the
Supreme Court apparently hoped to afford the states an enclave secure
from encroaching federal regulation and congressional preemption.46 The
result of Alexandria Scrap and the motivation behind it are not trouble-
some. What is troublesome is that the Alexandria Scrap holding is so
broadly framed as to bring within its ambit the clearly distinguishable case
presented in K.S.B. Technical Sales. The result of the latter case suggests a
need to reconcile the Court's desire to reduce the restrictions on state power
to regulate commerce with the need to prevent foreign commerce cases
from falling under the new approach. To accomplish this, the Court
should separate interstate commerce analysis from foreign commerce anal-
ysis and preserve in foreign commerce cases the traditional, flexible balanc-
ing test that has so well served its purpose of weighing federal interests
42. The Court stated simply that "[niothing in the purposes animating the Commerce
Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the mar-
ket and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." 426 U.S. at 810 (footnotes
omitted). Justice Brennan, in his dissent, stated: "It is true that the Court disclaims any con-
clusion today respecting congressional power to legislate in this area, . . . and I hope that is
so. I confess a logical difficulty, however, in understanding why, if the instant state action is
not 'the kind of action with which the Commerce Clause is concerned,' there can be any con-
gressional power to legislate in this area." 426 U.S. at 822 n.4 (citation omitted).
43. Two commentators have suggested possible rationales for the decision in Alexandria
Scrap, but both have been dubious of the validity of their own efforts to justify the decision.
See 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 893 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAiv. L.
Rv. 58, 58-63 (1976).
44. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (quoting Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
45. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 818 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. In other decisions, the Court has displayed a renewed solicitousness for state power.
It has invalidated federal schemes that encroach upon "state sovereignty," invoking the seldom
mentioned tenth amendment. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See also Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power See-
saw: Balancing National League of Cities, 11 GA. L. Rav. 35 (1976); Lay, States' Rights: The
Emergence of a New Judicial Perspective, 22 S.D. L. Rv. 1 (1977); Percy, National League of
Cities v. Usery: he Tenth Amendment Is Alive and Doing Well, 51 TUL. L. Rav. 95 (1976).
The Court has also increasingly upheld state statutory schemes that have substantial effects
on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977),
in which the Court overruled Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951),
holding that a Mississippi tax on the privilege of doing business in the state did not violate the
commerce clause; United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 799, 813-14
(1978); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 S. Ct. 988, 1005-06 (1978); Department of Revenue v.
Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 98 S. Ct. 1388, 1395-98 (1978).
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against those of the state.47 To partition interstate from foreign commerce
analysis in this fashion would mark a return to the historical relationship
between the two clauses and would produce a number of benefits.
A. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP OF FOREIGN COMMERCE TO
INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Although the U.S. Constitution enumerates within the same clause the
powers of Congress to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, 48 these
powers have not always been considered coextensive. At the turn of this
century, four dissenting justices in Champion v. Ames (the Lottery Case)49
argued that Congress lacked the power under the commerce clause to pro-
hibit by statute the interstate carriage of lottery tickets. In advancing this
contention, they pointed to the difference in scope between the interstate
and foreign commerce powers:
[T]he power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and the power to
regulate interstate commerce, are to be taken diverso intuitu, for the latter was
intended to secure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse as be-
tween the States, not to permit the creation of impediments to such inter-
course; while the former clothed Congress with that power over international
commerce, pertaining to a sovereign nation in its intercourse with foreign
nations, and subject, generally speaking, to no implied or reserved power in
the States. The laws which would be necessary and proper in the one case,
would not be necessary or proper in the other °50
Similarly, in Brolan v. United States, 5 1 the Court distinguished, albeit in
dictum, between the foreign and interstate commerce powers.5 2 In fact,
"[flrom almost the beginning of the Republic [until the United States
Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.5 3] it [was]
asserted that the power over foreign commerce is greater than that over
domestic commerce."4 By negative implication, the right of the states to
47. The seminal cases in the foreign commerce field are: Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 262 (1827) (state statute requiring importers of foreign goods to purchase import li-
cense violates foreign commerce clause); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939)
(protection against competitive effect of foreign cement in the Florida market held not suffi-
cient local purpose to keep foreign cement out by charging exorbitant inspection fees).
48. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, supra note 2.
49. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
50. Id. at 373 (dissenting opinion).
51. 236 U.S. 216 (1915).
52. Id. at 222.
53. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
54. 1 B. ScHwARTz, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONsTITUrTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 232 (1963). In Thurlow v. Mass. (the License Cases), 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 504 (1847), Chief Justice Taney wrote: "The power to regulate commerce among the
several States is granted to Congress in the same clause, and by the same words, as the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and is coextensive with it." Id. at 578. Professor
Schwartz, however, asserts that "[i]t has not, all the same, been until our own day that this has
really become an accurate statement." 1 B. ScHwARTz, supra, at 234.
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regulate matters incidentally affecting interstate commerce was thought to
exceed their right to enact legislation that either potentially or actually af-
fected foreign commerce.55 The Jones & Laughlin decision, however,
marked the beginning of the relaxation of restrictions on congressional
power over interstate commerce, and the interstate commerce and foreign
commerce powers were soon viewed as being of roughly equivalent scope.56
In recent years, courts have therefore applied essentially the same balancing
test in interstate and foreign commerce cases to determine whether state
action violates either part of the commerce clause.5 7 As a result the portion
of the commerce clause that refers to foreign commerce has lapsed into
dormancy.
B. BENEFITS OF PROPOSAL
To partition interstate commerce analysis from foreign commerce
analysis would thus represent a return to the historical understanding of the
relationship between those two powers. The Supreme Court would be free
both to expand existing areas of immunity for state regulation that affects
interstate commerce and to develop new areas of immunity. Yet state reg-
ulation of foreign commerce could not fall within these newly created areas
of immunity, and lower courts could be directed to apply the traditional
balancing test when a state sought to regulate commerce in a way that af-
fected foreign commerce. The net effect of this approach would be to per-
mit the expansion of state power within the United States without unduly
affecting the relations of the United States with other nations. The pro-
posed separation of interstate from foreign commerce analysis would have
other salutary effects as well: it would reduce lower court reliance on the
discredited "foreign affairs" doctrine, and it would eliminate the need to
resort to the often problematic preemption analysis.58
. Foreign Affairs Power
The U.S. Constitution makes no express grant of power to Congress or
the President to regulate foreign affairs.59 It does grant specific powers
relating to foreign affairs to one or more of the political departments,60 but
55. Compare G. GUNTHER, CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 278-80, 291-93 (9th ed. 1975) with L.
HENKmN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTmrnTIoN 129-71 (1972).
56. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 233-34.
57. See note 40 supra.
58. Revival of the foreign commerce clause would also foster the establishment of a fed-
eral common law standard for foreign commerce litigation involving private international law.
See Note, supra note 2, at 656-60 (1976).
59. For scholarly examinations of the foreign affairs power, see 2 B. Sc-wARTZ, supra
note 54, at 210 (1963); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3-5 (J. Jay), 42 (J. Madison), 80 (A. Hamilton).
60. For example, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cL 10 grants Congress the power "[t]o define and
punish... Offences against the Law of Nations"; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, dL 2 grants the
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"the organic provisions delegating such specific powers fall far short of cov-
ering comprehensively the whole field of foreign affairs. '61 In United
States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., Justicp Sutherland, writing for a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, took the position that the power of the federal
government to conduct external relations does not depend upon any affirm-
ative grant in the Constitution.62 Rather, he reasoned, the foreign affairs
power vests in the federal government as a necessary concomitant of na-
tionality.63
Legal scholars have vigorously attacked Justice Sutherland's opinion
in Curtiss-Wright, 6 and the Supreme Court has itself occasionally rejected
broad interpretations of the foreign relations power.65 Yet the California
Court of Appeals in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners66 re-
lied heavily on Curtiss-Wright in holding that California's Buy American
Act was unconstitutional. According to the court, the Act constituted an
impermissible interference with and "usurpation ... of the power of the
federal government to conduct foreign trade policy."'67 Bethlehem Steel
exemplifies the sort of unjustifiably broad holding that is likely to result
when a court applies the Curtiss-Wright doctrine in order to achieve a
favorable result.68 The delicate balance between state and federal power in
a federal system clearly requires a more sensitive evaluation of issues bear-
ing on U.S. foreign trade relations than can be made by invocation of the
"exclusive" foreign affairs powers of the federal government. The best al-
ternative to the approach followed by the Bethlehem Steel court is to divide
interstate commerce analysis from foreign commerce analysis and to con-
tinue to apply the balancing test in foreign commerce analysis. To do so
would provide a basis upon which courts presented with cases such as Beth-
lehem Steel could rest their decisions without having to resort to discredited
constitutional doctrines.
President the power "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur," and to "appoint Ambassadors [and] other
public Ministers and Consuls."
61. 2 B. ScHwARTz, supra note 54, at 96.
62. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
63. Id. at 317.
64. See, e.g., Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical
Reassessment, 83 YALE LJ. 1 (1973).
65. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 380-89 (1957) (Black. J., plurality opinion).
66. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
67. Id. at 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
68. "By rejecting [traditional commerce clause analysis] and stating a bold and sweeping
rule, the court weakened its otherwise commendable rejection of the California Buy American
Act." Note, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 164, 173 (1970).
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2 Preemption
As an alternative to the partitioning of foreign commerce analysis from
interstate commerce analysis, courts could continue to apply a single com-
merce clause test to both foreign and interstate cases, but resort to preemp-
tion analysis whenever state action in the foreign commerce context
threatens the integrity of the federal government more than state action in
the interstate context. Congress has legislated extensively in the field of
foreign trade, and no court would require great imagination to perceive
actual or potential conflict between a state law that affects foreign com-
merce and a federal statutory scheme regulating the same subject.69 Yet
this method of recognizing differences between cases involving foreign
commerce and those concerning interstate commerce is not a desirable al-
ternative to development of an independent body of law interpreting the
commerce clause power over foreign commerce.
The preemption doctrine is rooted in the supremacy clause of the Con-
stitution.70 It is less a doctrine, however, than a loose aggregation of dis-
parate tests that were developed in widely varying fact situations and are
replete with interpretational difficulties.7 ' Commentators have found that
courts which purport to apply preemption analysis are often "in actuality
implementing constitutional principles external to the supremacy clause
.... 72 If the court rationalizes its decisions on the basis of preemption
analysis "when it is actually motivated by other constitutional considera-
tions, the Court can only earn the disrespect of the legal profession and the
public."73 Moreover, courts should apply preemption analysis only after
making an initial determination that uniformity of regulation, ie., federal
69. Among the numerous international treaties and agreements that regulate foreign trade
to which the United States is a signatory are: GATT, supra note 14; the Tariff Act of 1930, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1976); the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976)). Congress has also unilaterally regulated foreign
trade. See, e.g., the federal Buy American Act, supra note 4.
70. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
71. For differing attempts to categorize the preemption tests applied by the courts,
compare Note, "Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-1946" Ten Years of
Federalism, 60 HARV. L. RaV. 262 (1946) with Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground- A
New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. RaV. 208 (1959). The above-mentioned notes also
deal with many of the interpretational problems faced by the courts. Examples of these
problems are: What constitutes "conflict"? To what sources does the court look for indica-
tions of congressional intent? What is "subject matter"? See also Note, Pre-emption and the
Commerce Clause Revisited" The 1975 Washington Tanker Law, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 691
(1977).
72. Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground'A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 208, 218 (1959).
73. Id. at 224.
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control, is not required in the particular subject area in which the state has
acted.74 In foreign commerce cases, however, the very point in issue is
whether uniformity is required, since foreign commerce necessarily involves
the relationship of the United States as a nation with other countries. Fur-
thermore, the courts must frequently act as interpreters of congressional in-
tent when applying preemption analysis. Yet when Congress has expressed
no view whether uniformity of regulation is required in a particular area,
the courts are placed in the difficult position of making Congress speak
when it manifestly has not spoken. The result is a fiction that may produce
results embarrassing to the courts.75 Development of a body of case law in
which the courts openly and candidly weigh the federal interest in main-
taining uniform foreign trade regulation against legitimate local interests
would eliminate many of the problems of categorization and interpretation
inherent in preemption analysis and would promote less obfuscatory analy-
sis of important national issues.
C. DRAWBACKS OF THE PROPOSAL
Such an approach is admittedly not without problems, the most impor-
tant of which is to reconcile foreign commerce holdings with interstate com-
merce holdings when both touch on different aspects of the same subject.
In K.S.B. Technical Sales, for example, the court seeihed troubled by the
prospect of striking down a Buy American statute when the United States
Supreme Court, in American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 76 had summarily af-
firmed77 a district court decision upholding a similar Buy Local statute.78
In American Yearbook, the plaintiff company, whose printing presses were
located outside Florida, attacked the validity of a Florida statute that re-
stricted public contract printing job awards to the lowest responsible bidder
74. More precisely, the doctrine has effect
only after the Court has decided that the subject matter which the state seeks to regu-
late is amenable to that diversity of rule which is the almost unavoidable result of
regulation by the several states and does not require that regulation be uniformly pres-
ent or uniformly absent.
Note, "Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-1946. Ten Years of Federal-
ism, 60 HARV. L. REv. 262, 262 (1946) (footnote omitted).
75. In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-09 (1956), the Supreme Court found that
Congress intended to preempt state sedition statutes by passing the Smith Act of 1940, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1976). Several Congressmen declared publicly that Congress had no
such intention, thereby leaving the Court red-faced. See Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential
Ground-4 New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 208 (1959).
76. 409 U.S. 904 (1972), arf'gmen 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (three judge court).
77. Summary affirmances are binding precedent upon the narrowest holding of the case.
The Supreme Court does not, however, necessarily adopt the reasoning of the court below.
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975).
78. "Buy Local" statutes require state government agencies to purchase only goods pro-
duced within the state. Nineteen states have such statutes. See notes 10-I1 supra.
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who would do the printing within the state.79 The district court upheld the
Florida statute in the face of the plaintiff's commerce clause argument, and
the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed.
To support its decision in K.S.B. Technical Sales, the New Jersey
Supreme Court cited the need to make the outcome of that case consistent
with American Yearbook--
[I]t would be odd indeed to find that when a state becomes less parochial and
chooses in its own purchases to prefer the products of the nation, as opposed
to those of the state, its purpose becomes suspect under the Commerce
Clause.
80
This argument at first seems convincing, since a statute that requires a
state agency to purchase only products made within the state precludes the
purchase both of goods made in other states and of goods made in other
nations. The effects of the Buy Local and Buy American statutes are differ-
ent, however. The Buy Local statute will in nearly all instances have a
lesser impact on foreign commerce than a Buy American statute because
the latter type of statute makes the entire nation, rather than a single state,
the primary market from which goods must be purchased. American prod-
ucts are likely to be "reasonably available"81 more often than products
from, for example, Oklahoma, California, or New Jersey. As a result, a
statute authorizing a state to purchase foreign goods only when they are not
reasonably available in the United States will effectively preclude foreign
competitors from making bids except under the most unusual circum-
stances. Under a Buy Local statute, by contrast, foreign competitors are
free to bid against out-of-state competitors if goods are not available in the
enacting state.
This quantitative difference in the effect on foreign commerce of Buy
Local and Buy American statutes is thus a major distinction between the
two types of measures. Many Buy Local statutes are also distinguishable
from Buy American statutes because the Buy Local provisions frequently
refer only to a particular interest.82 The Florida statute in American Year-
book, which pertained only to printing contracts, is illustrative of this pat-
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 283.01, 283.03 (West 1975).
80. 75 N.J. 272, 298, 381 A.2d 774, 787 (1977).
81. Nearly all state Buy Local statutes give preference to goods manufactured or produced
within the state only if they are available in marketable quantities or are of the same price and
quality as goods available abroad. See note 11 supra. For example, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:33-
2 (West 1955) gives a preference to domestic materials only if available "in commercial quanti-
ties ... of a satisfactory quality." The use of the term "reasonably available" is meant here
to embrace all the varying provisos attached to Buy Local and Buy American statutes.
82. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-18-103 (1973) (construction materials); IowA CODE
ANN. § 73.1 (West 1973) (food products and coal); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 8.280 (Vernon 1969)
(products derived from mines, forests and quarries); N.D. CENT. CODE § 48-02-10 (1978) (con-
struction materials); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 11 (1964) (construction materials); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 39.24.020 (1972) (fuels).
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tern. By contrast, the New Jersey statute, like Buy American statutes of
other states, disfavors all foreign-made goods. These two distinctions make
the New Jersey court's reluctance to strike down a Buy American statute in
light of the American Yearbook holding unfounded. In similar situations,
the courts should simply weigh the applicable foreign commerce considera-
tions against the possibility of producing anomalous results before render-
ing a decision.
CONCLUSION
The importance of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in K.S.B.
Technical Sales v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission may ulti-
mately lie not in its determination that the New Jersey Buy American stat-
ute is constitutional, but rather in its implications for analysis of future
foreign commerce cases. By mechanically applying the holding of Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., an interstate commerce case, to the facts of
IKS.B. Technical Sales, the New Jersey court in effect expanded the area of
immune state action created by the United States Supreme Court in Alexan-
dria Scrap to include actions affecting foreign commerce.
The recent trend in United States Supreme Court decisions favoring
expansion of state power and the Court's recent invocation of the long-
latent tenth amendment indicate a judicial impulse toward its pre-Jones &
Laughlin stance. If this trend continues, the Court should consider treating
foreign commerce cases not as mutations of interstate commerce cases, but
rather as separate and distinct entities. This would allow continued appli-
cation of the traditional commerce clause balancing test in foreign com-
merce cases such as K.S.B. Technical Sales, while enabling the Court to
formulate tests in the interstate context that tend to favor state power.
J Allen Miller
